The answer to my question is actually no. This is
Vengeance, one of al3x and
Timoni's two new cats (along
Justice).
I do however truly
Daves List - lots of monkeys staring at a screen....security? => TaoSecurity - Response to Daily Dave Thread =>
Matasano Chargen - Richard Bejtlich Sticks Up For IDS. I Retaliate.
There you go, you're caught up to speed now. Now before I start this whole thing I'd like to put out a
Disclaimer: All these people are smarter than me. Significantly. I am the low man in this group, and I aspire to be as well regarded as all of them are. And yet I've always found the best way to get better is to challenge yourself with the level you wish to be at. (Except in the original Mario Bros. If you went straight to world 8 you'd just get ripped up. Those warp zones didn't help anyone.)
Round 1: Me vs. DaveSo lets start at the beginning: Dave's List by Dave Aitel:
My feeling is that IDS is 1980's technology and doesn't work anymore. This makes Sourcefire and Counterpane valuable because they let people fill the checkbox at the lowest possible cost, but if it's free for all IBM customers to throw an IDS in the mix then the price of that checkbox is going to get driven down as well.
A couple things to note here. First the money question. I have no idea how much these companies make/are worth/spend. Neither does Dave I expect. It's a question that begets an answer, but I'm an infosec guy, not financial guy, so I'm gonna let it slide.
Second of all Managed Security Services aren't solely reliant on IDS for detection. There are many different security devices that managed/monitored/active security providers such as Counterpane accept connections from (and indeed if you go check their various websites they will all brag endlessly about the range of devices they support, from IDS to HIDS to Firewalls to.... look if it's on your network someone will probably have a way to monitor it).
I do have to mostly disagree with Dave's Third insinuated point: People only get security providers and/or IDS technology to comply with some piece of oversight. I have no doubt in some cases he's correct. I'm sure lots of companies only purchase such services/devices in order to meet a requirement. But to say that as a universal truth is like saying every company that buys fire extinguishers does so only to fill a requirement, and then shoves a crate of the things in a warehouse, never to be deployed or used when needed. I don't doubt that in the course of corporate America there hasn't been a company that did just that either. And yet I'm sure there are many who have deployed their fire extinguishers as recommended and they have been used to keep a small fire from becoming a large one. In the same way I know that there are many companies who have thoughtfully deployed Intrustion Detection Systems that have functioned exactly as expected, given them a greater visibility into their own security situation, internally and externally, and been used to thwart active threats.
Round 2: Me vs. RichardAnd now to Mr. B:
That's hasn't been true for a while, even if you're talking about Snort. Sure, there are tons of signatures, but they're certainly not just for content matching. If you're thinking about Bro, signatures aren't really even the main issue -- protocol anomaly detection is.
These "offense guys" as you refer to them Dave, aren't as uninformed as you seem to imply. Infosec is like any other two sided competition, and it's as important to understand what the other guy is gonna do as to know what you're going to do. IDS evasion, though not as effective as many people seem to believe, is still considered a necessary skill for pentesters. Give them their due.
I have to agree and expand on his second point. Signatures are still an important part of an IDS detection. Just like AV certain attacks have fingerprints, and with properly written signatures those fingerprints can turn into definite kills. That being said there are plenty of poorly written signatures, or attacks where the commands themselves are somewhat ambiguous. I with Mr. Bejtlich, it's not simply enough to know that a strange string passed through an open pipe. Sometimes it's a normal string going somewhere it doesn't normally, or at a faster rate than it normally does, or any number of nuanced things.
The problem is that anomaly detection in it's infancy. I used to focused mainly on IA research and as my interest in security grew I began considering combining both into joint projects, but was dissuaded by a number of grad students in the AI lab I was involved in, all of whom believed such techniques were not ready for something like network monitoring. Could they have been wrong? Sure. Do I still believe that AI isn't ready? I do. Could I be wrong? You bet.
The solution? All those "Monkeys" as Mr. Aitel so... tactfully () put it. Does it require a whole lot of brilliance to do that job well? Yes, but with the right tools any fairly competent operator can successfully act as both a signature and anomaly based detection engine, making up for the limitations of automated correlation engines, and making IDS a useful tool. As advanced as network security devices can be there is still no better correlation engine than a properly trained and equipped human mind. I'm the first one to agree that an IDS, with a baseline set of signatures, set up and never looked at is a glorified paperweight, but properly deployed, managed, and monitored and it is a valuable tool that gives visibility that no other device can, short of having someone who can read and analyze Wireshark dumps in real time.
I'll conclude by saying that I agree with Dave about "monkeys" staring at screens.
This is where I got totally frosted with Richard's response. I have read one of your books. Correct me if I'm wrong but it did seem fairly directed at those "Monkeys" and their type of work. So what am I supposed to take from this? You peddle knowledge that you don't believe to be effective as long as it sells copies? I certainly hope not. That your own time as a "Monkey" was wasted years of your life, where you added no protection, didn't alert anyone to anything relevant, and failed in your mission to protect the infrastructure of our nations military? I certainly hope not. This is your area of expertise. Few can argue you on this topic, so stand up for it, and if you can't than I recommend you take your books off the shelves because you're giving people a false sense of hope.
Round 3: Me vs. ThomasAnd as for Thomas Ptack I've gotta say he asked many questions and gave many responses that I would have given to Mr. Betjlich's arguments, but I still want to comment on a few of Thomas' thoughts.
Richard says, “it saved my bacon all the time at Ball Aerospace”. Alright, Richard, now tell us a story. And if the story ends in “so I scrubbed the infection off the desktop and nobody ever had to think about it again”, please find another story.
Come on. I know I can't, and I'm reasonably sure Richard can't, comment on failed or successful attacks against any group (private, Fortune 500, or military) under my, or his, protection. No one gives away that type of information in detail. Richard has been around the block. I'm sure he's seen every attack under the sun, and if he says his bacon, ham, or any other pork product has been saved as a result of an IDS I'm going to give him his due and believe him.
This should be an easy one to knock down. But all you say is, “this sounds like the ‘Snort is worthless’ argument”. You’re a smart guy who thinks about this stuff all the time, Richard. Can you actually address the argument I really made? I know a whole bunch of my readers can (and probably will, with expletives).
YES!! And excellent point. I asked the same thing. I'm not sure I can address it very eloquently, at least not as eloquently as Mr. Betjlich could, and should have, but I can say it simply: I use intrusion detection systems everyday and they work. A firewall is a great tool, it does provide protection (call it access control if you want) but an IDS provides visibility. It allows you to see attacks before they become full attacks. Attacks can fail before they start because and IDS allowed the operator to see the lead in vulnerability scan before the attack was even fully developed, and then initiate the right firewall rule to keep that attacker out. Is it fool proof? No. Will it keep out absolutely everyone? No. Will it keep out 95% of the "1337 Hackers" on the Internet? You bet.
ConclusionI don't believe any security technology is fool proof. HIDS, NIDS, IPS, Firewalls, Anti-Virus, all of them can fail and routinely do. A dedicated, properly skilled attacker can circumvent all of them. I have always believed (and this has no basis except my gut instinct) that 75% of attackers can be stopped with a decent firewall and a little bit of attention to what you have exposed. The next 22% of attackers are more competent than that, but even they can be stopped with a dedication to security, a properly protected environment, and a responsive team of people ready to deal with what happens. The top 3%? They can't be stopped. They will find a way if you have what they want. So what can you do? You can slow them down, you can dissuade them, you can convince them to go find easier pastures, lower hanging fruit, and get them to pick someone else who's going to be less effort. Does that mean we give up completely since we can't stop everyone all the time? Not at all. An IDS can't detect every single attack on a network. Does that mean it's useless? I don't believe so, and I've seen that demonstrated day in and day out. Is it worth improvement? Certainly. Will I rely on one solely? Not a chance. Would I set up a network without an IDS? No way.
So my final responses:
Dave: Until Canvas is undetectable to an IDS you don't have the right to consider them useless. And until Canvas can be used against any team of "monkeys" successfully then you've still got work to do.
Richard: Stand up for your own work. Give yourself some credit. Don't bow to these attack guys. They're good and creative, but they don't hold all the cards. Sometimes they hold aces, but sometimes they're bluffing.
Thomas: Well... I don't know. I mean, you never really proved or disproved anything. You had some good points, but you didn't make me doubt anything.
Cute cats weren't they?